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!Reglonal governnent tn contemporary western Europe corresponds to
a type of soclety and eeoncany varloualy label.letl "post-1nduetrl.a1",
"post-borrgeols" or nere\r  "the New E\lrope."l Ttrle New Europe evolved
hlstorlcally  frm  the lnterconnected strande of capltallsm; lnduetrlal-lom and
plurallatLc denocra,cy. It  resembles 1n many resBects the type of econq
and aoclety fanlllar  to us tn North Amerlca. Reglonal goverment ln such a
soclety le thus mere\r an adaptatton on the scale of half a contlnent of
foms of soclal and econcnrlc organtzatlon whictr evolved hlstorically  at the
nattonal level.  Reglonal government ln the Sew Europ,e ls the lnstltutlcna-1-
andl polLtical recognltton that socletlee have changed ctranatlcally sLnce L9!t5t
eo dranatlcaaly that they cannot be adequateLy descrlbed ln the doctrjnes aucl
ldeol-ogies nade fanlllar  by nl.neteenth and early twentleth century polti;ical
thought. fience the New Europe and lts  reglonal goverroent is the future of
that part of hlstory whleh hae also been aptly deacrlbed as "the end of
ldeoLogy."
I
Iet  the news of the laet few months aeema at varlance wlth this
e:ctreme vlev of thlngs.  Dlslntegratlon and natlonallst lmnoblllsme appcar
to clolnate rather than the advance of reglonal government. Francers veto
of January f953 stopped not only the entry of Brltaln lnto the Erropean
Coraunlty of the Slx, but ln effect postponed the merger of the Europe of
Seven vlth  the Conmunlty. EFTA, after appearLng to be on the thresholtl of
il1ssolut1on1 acqutred a new lease on llfe  as a result.  In agrlculturer the
Ccmrrnlty has succeeded ln transl-atlng the general pollcy aclopted a. year agi
onlgr to ame c@od.Lties,  such as wlne, fruit,  vegetables and eggs. But
dleagreement on target prlces and levles contlnues with respect to porli and
gorne cereaLs, whtle lnterest group representatlves, parllamentarlans  and
goverrment e:rperts contlnue to squabble about the proper conpromise. In 'Lhu-2-
fteld  of energy, the Councll of Mlnisters ls  now consiclering the fourth
"lnterlm memorandt:m" of the Community Executives regardl.ng the proper role
ancl Brlclng of o1L1 coal, natural. gas and l5rdroelectrlc power. Agaln, the
lnterest groups press thelr  cLalms and governments  support or reJect them
ln llne wlth natlonal pereeptlons of lnterest, thus far to the detrlnent
of a eoherent reglonal pollcy,  Durtng the surmerl the special polltlcal
agreement between Bonn and Parls went lnto effect, thus slmbollzlng to some
Europeans that speclaL Franco-Gernan  relattonshlp whlch mlght lnstltutlonall.ze
the hegemorqr of cle GauLle over the Comunlty of the Slx.  flre General'e
offer of a l-illlputlan  French nuclear r:mbrella to hls flve partners has
done nothlng to dlspel thls irrpression. If  the Fouchet PLan for a politlcal
confed.eratlonr  an Europe *es pqtrles, superlmposed on the exletlng reglonal
SoverDrnent  was turned dlotrn by four of the Six, lts  lnstltutlonallzatlon
anong two of them ls  sttll  perceived as dlsturblng.
Nor are things any better outsLcle the franework of the six.
Long-stancllng efforts to refurblsh NATO ae a ffianlc  agency for worklng out
connrcn Atlantlc defense and forelgn pollcles have achleved ltttl-e.  Ttre
Amerlcan proposal to share controL of the safety catch on the nuclear
deterrent by means of the IIAT0 MultllateraL Nuclear Force has been
cold-shouldered by Franc€ and. greetecl with reserve by Brltaln.  Oily geraany
6eems fu].ty conmlttecl to the lclea. f?re Organlzatlon for Econmie Cooperatlon
and Developnent, for all  lts  pronlslng work on the sharlng of atd, to the
non-western worldr has done llttle  to smooth the lnclpient Unlted States-Comton
Market tartff  war of whlch the chicken rather than rooster or the bald eagle
1s the s3rmbol. Nor has it  been used to advance the eause of coordlnatlng
Atlantlc monetarlr  and trade pollcy.
fhe unfortunate  image of the ctr:nbbell has been lnvoked. to descrtbe the
cleslrable relattonshlp between North Amerlca on the one hand and a unlted-3-
western Brrrope on the other, an lmage more reepeetfully labetJ.eil "partnershtp"
by Presiclent Kennedy as wel"l as by Preeldent Hallsteln of the EEC ConnnJsslon.
Parbnership connotes elose cooperatlon tled to mutualS-y respectful dlstance;
hence people affillated  wlth the Atlantic Counell of the Unlted States prefer
to speak of "conmunity, or of close lnstitutlonal  and quasl-federative tles,
to take the place of the current At1antlc etructure whlch merely perpetuates
d.lsarray. Yet the notions of partnership or connunity arnong two equal and
al-lledl blocs have begun to cornpete wlth rlval. lmages lnvoking a vlsion of
concentric circles with the European Conmunlty at the cor€, or of an even
looser system of polycentrlsm whlch both Brltain and Franee would retaln
lnd.epenclent  relations lnslde as wel]. as outside the AtLantlc worLd.
These events and the prescriptlons for reform bespeak dlslntegratlon
rather than a shiny New Europe or New Atlantib.  Have they undermined the
system of regional government whlch has developed. ln the Cororrunlty of the Six,
the system which goes und.er the labeL of "supranationallty"? To answer thls
questlon the nature of supranatlonallty must first  be vell  understood.
General de Oaulle equates supranatlonallty wlth a federallsm whlch he
dletests; Jean Monnet ldentifles lt  wlth a federallsm of whtch he ts a leadlng
partlsan.  Both gentlemen mlstake the eseenee of the phenomenon even though
Monnet le rlghtfuJ.\r consldered its  foundlng father.  Brltish  etatesmen vere
repelled by the European Comnunlty for a long tlme because they could concelve
only of fed.eral or traclitlonal lnter-goverrunental lnternatlonal institutlons
ancl they hel-cl the Communlty to be almost federal.  Supranatlonallty,  however,
ls nelther fed.eralism nor lntimate intergovernmental  cooperatlon  even though
the lnstitutions lt  employs resemble those of a federation more than the
unlted Nations or NATO. supranatlonallty  ls a unique style of maklng
inte:-':r:ri-io::a1  rlecisions, unique because of the nature of the partlclpantsl the
co::texb 1:: l;hlch decinic,rs are naC.;, ancl the quality of the declsions produced.-\-
The particlBants ln the supranatlonal dectelon-maktng  procesg
lnclude of course "government6"; lndeed, they theoretlcal\y dornlnate lt
because thetr representettves constttute the Counells of Mlnlsters whlch rule
the three Comunltlee. But these representatlves  are for the most part high
clvll  servants meetlng ln almost contlnuoue eonfrontatlon  wlth thelr opposLte
nrmbers and. worklng out conmon pollcles on the basis of thelr perceptlon of
the technical posslbtlltles lnherent ln whatever ls belng cllseussed. OnIy
excdptlonally are decLslons wholly rnatte by the mlnlsters themselves, and then
onJy on the basls of suggestlons and propoeals prepared by tbe European
Cmrlsslon or the High Authorlty; that lsr by experts whose Job lt  ls to
flnd comron ground among the slx natlons. Other pa.rtielpants lnclucle
spokesuen for all ma.Jor natlonal and European lntereet groups who confer
aLnoet aIL the tlne wlth the speelallsts tn the Cornmunity  executlves. Proposals
by the executtves to the ninlsters always take lnto account the demands of the
naJor lnterest groups. Flnallyr the legislatures of the slx countrles
partlclpate 1n the forn of the European ParlLament which nakes its wishes
knorn and demands to be consulted by the ComnlsslorrB oDd the Higtt Autborlty.
If  tt  ls sttLl true tha.t the representatlves of the slx governrnents dtspose,
thls le ao only because the European exeeutlves ln consultatlon wlth prtvate
and parllanentary groups propose. ftre alternatlve dlsposltlons are deflned
anct LLn1tecl by the range of proposals stewnlng from extra-governmentaL  eources.
The context of supranatlonal-  decleions ls eeonomicp soclal and teehnlcal.
But thle shoultl not lead us to conelude that Just because enpress\r "polLtlca.)."
and mllltary lssues are excluded supranatlonal dectelons are somehow secondary.
Ttre essence of supranatlonality Lies 1n the tendlency for economlc and soclal
declelons to "sp111 over" lnto the realn of the polltlcaLl to arlse from and
further lnfluence the poJ.ltJ.cal aoplrations of the maJor grouplngs and partles
1n deurocratlc societLes. The supranattonal style stresses the lndirect-r-
penetrstlon of the polttlcal  by way of the economlc because the "pure\r"
econonle declsLone aluays acqulre polltlcal  slgnlflcance ln the ralnde of the
partlclpants.  In ehortl the klnd of eeonomlce and soclal questlons here
dealt wtth are those at the very core of the modern welfare state'
Itre quallty of eupranattonal  declsions tllffers  sharp\y from the federal
andl the inter-goverrunental  norm. In lntergovernmental  negotlations dlfferlng
lnltlal  poettlons are Usually cornpromised on the level of the lowest co1ntnon
denonlnator. That 1s, the lea.st cooperatlve parttclpant deflnes the llnlts
of the comBromlse. In federal systems slmple rraJoritarianlsm  decldes ln
ultirnate eituatLons of conflict,  even lf  this be the maJorlty of one vote on
a federal Supreme Court,  fn supranational syst€tn61 orl the other hand, the
comprornlee pattern often involves "sllttting  the dlfference" between the flnal
bargalnlng posltlons of the particlpants.  More signlficantly still,  supra-
natlonal eystems feature a bargainlng process whlch I  caLl "upgradlng colmon
lntereete,"  It  occurs when the partlclpants have great dlfficulty  tn arrlvlng
at a eormon pollcy; yet they do agree thab they should have some cormon
etancl ln order to eafeguard other aspects of lnterdependence  among them.
Hence they tend to swap concessions in related field,s, but outslde the speclflc
conterbs ln whlch dlsagreement prevails.  Further the swapplng takee place on
the basls of servlees renderect by an lnstltutl-onallzed conclllator with powere
of hls olrn, the Er.rropean executlves; that body ls  able to construct pa.tterns
of nutua*l concesslons from various poliey contexts and in so doing ueuaLly
nanage6 to Wgrade its  oun powers at the etq)ense of the member governments.
yet those governments do not feel as 1f they had been bulliecl:  cormon
intereets are upgraded also in the sense that each feels that by concedlng
gonething 1t gainect sonethlng else.  Ihe final  compromlse, far from somehovt
ctebaslng the bargalning process, lnduees a feeling of corutitment, of creativity
and of galn ln the ParticiPants.-6-
Hence lt  ts a mlstake to argue, as spokesmen for the Conmunltles
ueually dlor that "the erlterla  by whlch poltcy clecislone a,re made &re no longer
Burely natlonal erlteria.:  there le also recognlzed" to be a "Comunlty"  point
of vlew whleh artses out of a consideratlonp from an obJectlve standpolntr
of the lnterest of the economlc unlt as a whole."2 In an obJectlve sense
there ls no demonstrable  "Comnuntty vlew point"l  lf  by that we mean a voluntary
natlonal eubordlnatlon to the general interest as defined by the executLves'
But tbere ts a cumnlative pattern of acconrnodatlon ln which the partlclpants
refratn from r:ncondltlonal-Iy vetoing proposa.ls and lnstead seek to attaln
agreement by means of compromlses  upgrading co,rmon intereets.
Havlng deflnecl the supranatlonal style, we can now answer the questlon
of the disintegrative  effects of recent evente. Clearlyl General de GauILe
cloes no! play the gane accordlng to these rules.  Supranationallty evolved
gratlually sinee the inceptlon of the CoaI and Steel Comunlty ln 1952 ln a
ma111xer falling  short of Monnet's federallsn but exceeding Britlsh ldeas of
intergovernmental  cooperation. De Ga,ulle is  oomlng elose to stopping that
evolutlon. fhls ls true clesplte the admittecl fact that the Flfth Republlc
has honored its  obllga,tlons under the treaties establishing the three
Comunltlea even though it  iteplores the surrender of soveretgnty lmpllclt  ln
this.  It  ts true even though the Flfth Republic has taken the lnltlatlve  ln
proposlng ancl executing several measures which i.nvolved the upgradlng of
colmon interests, a.s for example in the case of agriculture and the acceler-
atlon of tarlff  disnantling.  Ttre point is that such steps were teken only
when the government felt  these steps to be in the natlonal--rather  than the
E\rropean--lnterest andl that lt  has adamantly reslsted other attempts to
upgrade conmon interests when de Geulle eonsf-dered the surrender of further
soveretgnty  undeslrable  .-7-
TLre Oaulllst vlslon of the New Europe ls not supranatlonal and not
federal.  It  ls  conf'ederal; tt  lfuults the parttctpants to rnlnlstersl the
contexts to the polltical  ln the grand 6en6e and the quallty of the declslons
to unanimoue g€feement definecl by the leadlng natlons.  In the words of
forrner prfune mlnister Debrd:
In Europe, Iegitima.te power ls the power whlch comes from natlonal
soverelgnty and agalnst this power arbltrary outslde tyrannies like
the so-cal-Ied. rsupranatlonal' instltutlons  can do nothlng.  European
unlty is becomlng, and wiIL contlnue to become: a reality  through
the wilJ. of these who legltimalely wield power ln each of the countrlee
whlch together make up EuroPe.J
The appeal is to a pre-modern  notion of na,tlonal soverelguty which exalts the
polltlcal  at the elrpense of the economie and soclal.  Ttre Fouchet PIan and
tbe bllateral  Treaty with Bonn exemplify the Gaulllst eonception of a European
confederation. I^IlIl it  suceessfirlly  impede suprana.tLonal integratlon whlch
reverses the emphasls and thereby avolds the notlon of soverelgnty altogether?
Thls foluuJ.ation contalns the larger questlon of ttre uLtlnate future
of E\rroper the shape of E\rropean soclety and the manner of governlng lt.  De
GauLle agreee vlth  the EuroBean feclerallsts 1n bellevlng that the present
structure ie an lmpossible half-vay house. fire Federal-lst posltion disdalns
t'mere" economlce; or at best eonslders it  a nece66ary area of Joint actlon
among natione before the ultimate political  stage of constitutional- federation
ls reaehed, wlth its  panoply of d.1rectly elected European leglsJ,ature, federal
executlve enJoylng general powers and federal Judlelary.  Emphasis is  on
cormnltmentr falthr  vislon and a certaln nethod of politics.  Llttle  is  said.
about the content of pollties  exeept to stress the mystical superlority of
a "polltlcal"  guallty over the humclrura collectlon of social welfare n€8sur€6.
For d.e GauLle the supreme element ls bellef in the lmrrutable  nature of
"hlgh polltlcs",  of Grosspolitlk ln the e:cpresslve Bisnarckian phrase.
Economlcsl nllltary  etrateg6, social welfare, agrlcultural prices, relatlons-B-
wlth underdeveloped countries--a.Ll  these &re 60 nany substantlve sub-ltene 1n
the pursuit of the supreme eubstance, the defense of the nattonal lntereet.
It  so happens that thls  lnterest le held by dle Gaulle to be closely tled to
that of the other eontinental Europea,n natlons.  But a confederacy  ls a]-l that
ts requlretl to realize and assert lt  agalnst others.  In short, thls  argument
asserts that the Europe of the three supranatlonal Communlties cannot last:  lt
mrst elther become a full-fledged  federation or a. confederacy  under the
hegemorly of the most lmportant constituent natlons.h
Few people belleve that the exlstlng system of reglonal government,
that supranationaL  method now under Freneh attack, has a clalm to longevlty.
I beLleve that it  does. Because it  corresponds to the nature of the New Europe,
the Europe of adaptative lnterest groups, bureaucraciesr technoerats  and
other units wlth modest but pragnatlc Lnterests resembllng the traclltional
natlonallsms of Grosgpolltik  only very renotely, lt  nay well be a real system
of government rather than a mere tenporary etyle.  "There are more things in
Heaven ancl Earth, General de Gauller than are dreamt of in your phlLosophy."
II
What are these characteristics of the New Europe? Its  maln economlc
cou;ronent ls nelther capitallsm nor soclallsm: lt  ie lndustria,llsm. Industryt
under vhatever malragement, easl\y produees enough to nake everybodly comfortable.
Minlnun standard.s of consumptlon  are assuned ae g!.ven for the entire cttlzenry.
If  the market mechanlsm and free\r negotia.ted  wage levels fall  to attaln the
mlnlma the etate lntervenes lrlth  subsidLes, fami\y allowances, soclal security
palments, educatlonal scholarshipe and retralnlng firnds. Blsing productlon
ancl rislng eonsrxnption are brought lnto gear by more or less systenatlcally
pursued policles of fuLJ- employnent or tncome guarantees.  The flow of
lnvestment necessary for thls ls  assured by policies of central steering
through tax laws, credlt poltcy and direct consultatlon between government,-9-
lnttustry antl organlzecl labor.  Forelgn trade pollcy beccmes partlcularly
lrnportant in  sueh a eontext because it  tentts to be manlpulated to serve the
ends of domestlc productl.on and conaumptlon; thle te ae true at the reglonal
ae at the natlonal level.
The New Europe has worked out a pragna,tic eynthesls of capltallsm ancl
soctalism ln the forrn of democratlc planning. NatlonallzatJon  of industrles
1s sometines, but not eoneLstently,  employetl; the price system and the
msrket rernatn the central reguJ-atory agents. Plannlng takes place in the fom
of forecaets of demand for speciflc products ln speclfic lnclustrlal eectorst
whlch are then presented in the fom of aggregate forecasts. Plannlng,
unllke the eomunlst varlant, avolils flxecl production targets.  It  "progran6"
desirable lnvestment and productlon levels ln llne with predictecl denand
and interferes with the self-adJustlng market only to that erbent. For our
purpose6, the mechanlsm of thls prograrrrmLng process is of central lmportance.
It  features the eontlnuous partlelpatlon of all  maJor voluntary groups ln
European society through elaborate  systems of conmlttees and eounclls. Itre
techntcal bureaucraeles of trade unlons, indlustrlal assoclatlons, bankers and
faruers slt  down wlth the technocrats from the mlnlstrles of finance, labor
and economlcs--or  with centraL government planning offices--to shape the f\rture.
Stattstics tend to repJ-ace lcleoJ-ogy and dogura. Petnanent r''gotlatlon  and
occasional eonclllatlon tend to replace actlve confrontatlon; doctrinaLre
dlecussion and class warfare. Ttre eymbol- le compulsory arbitratlon rather
than the general strlke-
These economic features clearly rest on a soelal substratum very
dlfferent from that portrayed 1n the inherlted western icleoLogles. Rel-atlve
upward rnobility now obtains. Relatlve soctal- equal-ity, at }east a.s compared
to the situatlon flfty  yea,rs ago, ls  in the aseendency.  The fomerly a.Iienatecl
worklng class Eeems to have made its  peaee with the industrlal syetem, perhaps-l-o-
because stronger unions ln large-scole enterprlses glve lt  more ecope for
partlclpatlon  than was true in the earller perlod of small famlly'owned and
managed plants.  Icleol-ogy hae lost lte  relevance ln the reJ-atlons  between
workers, lnduotrlal managers and middle class professlonals. The groups
whlch fintl lt  difflcult  to adJust to tntluetrlallsm are the ones for whom
itleologies rematn lmportant.  The lower mltldle class shopkeepersr ertisane
and lnefficlent  farmers who are hard pressed by the atlvent of masslve
lndustrlallsrn and large-ecale  bureauera,tized  enterprlses of all  klnds are
the maln consumers of doctrlnalre ldeology today, whether thle be corsnunism
or some form of organic, status-orlented fascism. But even here the advent
of the reglonal logic is manlfest: contemporary neo-fasclet groups ln
Europe profess a specles of pan-Europea^n  nationallsm dlrected agalnst Russla,
the Unltect States anct the Afro-Asian world, ra,ther than the more familiar
Ge::rnanlcr GaIItc or Roman varietles; it  ts a "white man's" natlonallsm directed
agatnst "lnferlor"  extra-European  races. fhe communiets, for their part, are
beginnlng to make their peace wtth the erstwhile "clerical-fasclst  consplracy"
by eneouraging thelr trade unions to partlclpate as Just another lnterest group
tn the decision-rnaking proeess of the Comnunltles. Ideology; then, ls  still
wlth ue.  But 1t roanlfests Ltself ln rellglouer ethnlc ancl educatlonal pollcy
confrontatl-ons  rather than !n the realrn of the econor\y or the large lssues
of defense and forelgn policy.  Thus ve find lts  continued. role prlnarlly
ln Belgiun, Italy  and France rather than ln Scandinaviar Britain,  Germany or
Austrla.  Ideology ls muted to the extent that cleavages ln the natlonaL
popul-atlons  cut acroos contexte rather than clustering ln ftrm groups unlted
on a vartety of lssues. If  a eitizen can bestow his support--or hls
lndlfference--to  differing groups for purposes of educatlon, welfa,re r€aBUre8l
rellglonp defense, recreatlon and ethnie ldentity the loglc of a plurallsm
ba,sed on cross-cutting cleavages will  continue to mute ideology. On1y lf  a
cltizen relles on hls party or assoclatlon for all  of these aims will  the-I1-
Ioglc of plurall-sn be defeated. The comr.rntet poet Louls Aragon nlght have
sBoken for  soure soclaJ-lsts and sone christlan-derlocrats when he eald
mon partl m'a rend,u nes yeux et ma mdmoire
mon parti m'a donnd le  seng de I'dpoque
mon partl2 iloo partl,  mercl pour tes }egrons...
In the l,Iew Europe, however, thls cLustering of affeetlons and expectatlons
seems to be a. thlng of the past.
fndeed, vhen we turn to the polltical  style of the New Europe, perhape
lndlfferenee is the key term.  More for:naIIy we call  the process of removlng
ldeolory from polltice  "depolltleizatlon."  Polltical  partl-es renaln lntact;
but they are no longer dlvldect by glarlng eontroversy because all  the naJor
socla]. and economlc issues of fifty  years ago no longer plague the body polltlc.
Campalgns tentt to avold the great prtnclples  and to stress efflclency ln
administratlon. As a Swertlsh coumentator put lt,  "as the general etanda.rd.
of values is  so cormonly accepted, the functions of the state become so
technlcal as to nake polttlcs  appear as a kind of applled stattstlcs....
Votlng tn our ciay ls much less than ln earlLer ttmes a proof of polittcal
lnterest; efectlons should rather be consldered as a general censue."5
In nany European countries cabi-nets are non formed on the basls of more or
Iess permanent coalitlons among powerful parties unitecl In a general consensus
on the d.esira.bllity to preserve and develop lndustrial society.  Moreovert
they agree on suborcllnatlng most other publle questtons to this cleslre.
fndustrial society is run by technocrats, inevitably.  And eo the technocrat
has become the emlnence glise- of all  government, publlc and private, locaI,
natlonal and reglonal.  As the firnction of a. parlianentary opposltlon  has
loet lte  sharpness the average cltlzen has Lost much of hls lnterest ln
polltics.  PoLitics Ln such a settlng has been aptly described as the poJ"ltlcs-L2-
of collective bargalnlng  among groups, all  of vhom accept the legltlnacy of
representatlon  of each portletpant'  The argument  among the groups, then,
le merely over the sllce of the ple to be glven to each. At the European
reglonal level this  irrage need not undergo any qualitative restatement:
the ergument is  no longer over the sllee of the pie to go to each; it  le
increasing\r over the means for lncreaoing the overall size of the pastry'
h-rt othervlse the style of moderate eceornmodation,  unlversal representation
snd medtatlon by technocrets remains es eentraL at the reglonal as at the
national 1evel.  Ho1l-and, Belgium, Austrta and Sweden epitomlze this trend'
In 6ermany the reuniftcatlon issue somewhat blurs the same phenomenont
vlrlle in Italy  the relative i.mneturity of l-ndustriallsm contributes to the
continued presence of the older pattern of politics.  In Brltain the nodal
pattern prevails even though it  is  obscured by the dominance of the
two-party systeur vhich normally nakes coalltlon polltics  unnecessary.  The
naJor exceptton to the trend is  France where the tovering flgure of General
de Gaulle imposes an unnatural style on polltics  which would otherwlse
conform to the depotiticlzed trend, as lndeecl it  dicl under the Fourth Republlc'
In such a setting there is but llttle  trace of a purely polltical
dimenelon. Gr:osspolltlk is merely a phrase lefb over from a pre-lndustrlsl
eettlng, natlonsl grandeur and natlonal destlny conceptlons which the upvard
mobiLe ettlzen weighs dlstrustfully  against the neu Telly, Renault, or that
trtp  to the blue Aclrlstlc.  In a eense, everythlng ls polltlcal  slmply because
the rnodern industrial system engenders publlc concern'-lf aot control--over
so mar\y aspects of economic and social life.  Br:t by the same token there ts
no longer a dtsttnctly polltical  fr:nction, seperate from econonlcs, welfere
or education, a function vhlch flnds lts  reeson for being in the subllne
helghts of foreign policy, defense ancl eonstitution rnaking.-13-
It  vllL  hsve become elear by now that the supranatlonal  seheme of
government at the regionol" level bears a very strlklng resemblance to the
prevalJ-lng nature of goverrrnent at the level of the lndustrlal netlon 1n
everythlng but constltutlonal tennlnology. Supranatlonallty,  not federatton,
confederatlon or lntergovernmental organlzation, seems to be the approprlate
reglonal counterpart to the natlonal state whlch no longer feels capable of
realtzlng velfare aims wlthin I'bs own narrov bordere, whleh has made lts
peaee wlth the fact of lnterdependenee  Ln an lnilustrlal  and egalttarlan age.
It  represents the nethod odopted to secure maximum welfare, lncludlng ntlltary
securlty, for a post-lndustrlal state vhlch no longer coneelves of 1ts
lntereste ln stark\r polttlcal  and nationallstlc terms. The advent of
st4rranatlonallty synrbollzes the vietory of economics over polltics,  over that
fanillar  ethnocentric natlonallsm uhich used to subordinate butter to guns,
reason to passlon, statistical  bargatning to excited demands.
Recent history offers a number of  lnstances in support of thts
eoncluslon. Brltaln's  declsion to forego 1ts lndependent  nuclear detenent
uas motlvated by conslderatlons of cost, that is,  by the declelon not to
sacrlflce welfare.  Her ill-fatect  declston to Joln the Communlty of the Stx
lmplled very serious souf--seerchlng  snd ended with the actual abandorment  of
a nattonallst mood and calculus vhich had long been taken for granted. Nonray
and $weden have been known for thelr nroderatton ln international affalrs,
but aleo for thelr flerce lndependence from entangJ.enents  and the passlonate
bellef ln the value of their  natlonal waye of llfe.  Notwlthstandlng  these
facts Nomay applled f,or full  admisslon to the Lnner circle of the Slx,
wlth all  1ts supranationallty, and Sweden sought the Iess blndlng tie  of
economlc assoclation wlth the Community. Ilpon being rebuffed 1n the crisls
of January 1p6l  neutral Sweden vas in the forefront of those seeking to
give EITA a much more supranatlonal  scope than 1t had hltherto been perrnitted-Ilr-
to acqulre. Even Swltzerland,  to whom neutrallty orvd aloofmese {.s bhe nstlonal
way of Llfe,  arxlously dtscusses the alternatlvee open to her.  frlke rnarly others,
the Swtse would prefer a clearcut dlsttnetton between the c<rneb!.tutlonal and
polltlcal  dlmenston on the one hand, and the polltlcs  of economlcs on the
other.  If  Europe opted for political  unificatlon they would stay aloof; but
1f a "mere" economic unton were the final  pJ-an they could make thelr peace
ulth lt.  "Only when that declslon is  made can we dlstlnguish onee more between
the two plans lrhose confuslon obstruets all  dlscusslon",  eornplalns  Herbert
fiitny.  "Customs officlals  vlll  cease meklng policy and statesnen will  eea6e
bultdlng Europe by organizlng a market for beasts."6 But it  ls the essenee
of the New Europe that the market for beasts and the discussion of ultinate
politlcal  destinles can rtro longer be separated. In a welfare-oriented,
lndustrial and teehnocratlc order ultimate polltlcal  concerns are ever more
closely lntertwlnecl wlth these more noundane conslderatlons.
III
Our argr:nent, however, runs lnto the very obvlous obstacle of actlve
disllke for the suprenational method on the part of some Europeans and of
thelr practical reslstance to continued lntegratlon, both emong the Six end
between the Six and the rest of Europe as vell  as North Amerlca. Itrls
reslstanee is  explained by some seholars as a rnanlfestatlon of the reassertlon
of the polltteal  functlon.  Supranatlonal  tntegration may vell  take place on
the basis of economlc pollcies spllltng over lnto more and nore neighborlng
fields of actlvity,  they suggest, untll  the economlc potentlalltles of the
process are exhausterl. As long as ve are merely dlsmantling tariffs,  estabUsh-
ing fair  pricing rules for steel, haruonlzing social seeurity rates and
facllltating  the free movement of nanpower  we renatn withln the loglc of the
economic splll-over.  But onee the limtts of these tasks are reached, once
these obJecttves are attained, we are up agalnst the hard core of polities:-15-
forelgn polley coorcllnatlon,  defense arrangementa  ancl the ultlmate relatlonshlp
between natlopal polltical  plannlng and Trat*-onal eeonomie wel-fare. I{hen
etetesmen feel that thls polnt hae been rea,ehed--ae de Gaulle clearly has--the
spllL-over wlll  trlckle  away and lntegratlon wlll  elther stop or take on a
purely politlcal-constltuilonal  hue.  Supranatlonality  wlll  then be condeumeil
to Llnger llstl-essly in the economlc instltutlons already created but foreelosed
from further development.T  The Europe of the Six may be ai this potnt now.
Ttris fotsulatlon mletakes the nature of the New Europe. It  ls not only
the outer nllttary  shetL of nations whlch has become very penetrable.
Self-rellance equals the fltrtation  with suicide not only ln the realm of
6efense. Ttre outer shel-l of natlons has become penetra.ble  even more ln tenns
of trad.el travel,  lnvestment, values and welfare in proportlon to the degree
of lnclustrlal pluralism whlch preva.ils clomestically.  The lmage whlch
characterizes the natlon-state ae a warm ancl self-contained cormrunlty  and
Juxtaposes lt  to the colder and more caLculatlng world of nation-states
labell-ecl "lnternational society" ls over-sinpllfied and nisleadlng, at leagt
ln the North Atlantlc area.  ltre lnternal  as welt as the external network of
relatlons of natlons constitute a speclee of soclety; both increasLngl-y functlon
on the baels of caLculated Lnterest and adJustment among lnterestel on the
part of voluntary groups as well ae of governments. And the extent of the
adJustment ls deepJ.y influenced by the degree of penetrablllty whtch the outer
shell of the total  natlonaL corpus perrnits.
Ar::ned wtth thls perspeetlve Let us have another l-ook at the splll-over
procees. Whlle lt  assumee the continued commltment  of naJor participants to
the proeess of integratlon, lt  does not presume passionate enthuslasrn  and
takes for granted opposltlon to specifie items ln the catalog of lntegratlve
ventures. The support for glven steps rests on the convergence of expectatlons
of the particlpants; competlng ercpectations  and goals ean be corrproudsed on-15-
the basis of swapplng concessLons from a varlety of sectors, all  under the
gerrerallzed purvlew of supranational lnstltutlons  encl proeesses. Lack of
agreement anong goverrunents can thus glve rlse to lncreased delegated ps$te"s
on the part of these tnstltutions.  Dlssattsfaction wlth the results of
partial  economlc steps may lead l-abor and lndustry to demand new central actlon.
Supranatlonal  instltutlons  and national. groups may create situations whlch
can onLy be deaLt with through eentral actlon, unless the nations are
wlJ-Ilng to suffer deprivattons ln welfare.  The very penetrability of the
natlonal shell leaves the na.tion open to the lure of inter-sectorlal bargalns
whereby one government ls wilting to take a loss 1n exchange for a gain ln
another sector.  Nations outslde the economlc grouping but deeply lntertwlned
with tt  through the actlvities  of their  cittzens may elq)erienee problems
whlch can only be solved--lf welfare is not to be sacrificed--by joining
the grouplng and upgracllng its  centrrl potutu.B No statesmaJlr even if  he
cleeply rtislikes the proce6s, can pertanently lsolate his nation from a
cowrltment to unlty which 1s already partia1-ly imp]emented, unless he i"s
wllling  to pay the prlce tn dlmlntshed welfare.  De Gaulle may be willing  to
pay that price; but f  doubt that French soclety i6.  Moreover, if  de Gaulle
e:qrects Holland, Belgium, Italy  and post-Adenauer Gennany to endorse certain
French goals he wlLJ. be obllged to pay for this  support by acquiesclng to the
goal elqrectatlons of hls al-Iies.  And this  lnvolves him wllly-nllly  in more
supranational lntegratlon .
Whatl then, 1s sptlllng  over in the Europe of the Six desplte current
French poLicy? i,,lhere iloes the 6eneralized post-natlonal statistical  mood
rnanlfest itself  even though lt  does not fit  the lpth century natlonal
sentlments of the General? Despiti.-; rr snall's pace, but because of French
lnslstence, the lntegrated agricultural marketing system is beginning to
operate for certain commodlties, even though no single lnterest group or-r?-
government  eeems to be completely happy wlth 1t.  The hanoonlzatlon  of
turnover taxes ls naklng elow progress under the actlve medlatlon of the EEC
Ccrmlsslon. fhe flrst  reguLatlon6 concernlng a harrnonlzed social eecurtty
system have come lnto operatlon. Europe has lts  flrst  modest corunon regl,.llatlon
governlng ccrrnpetttlon, even though the appreclably dlfferent approaches of
the Cornnon Market ancl Coal/Steel Treaties are creatlng confuslon ln this
real-m. The relatlve tnflexlbll-ity  of the CoaI/SteeI Ibeatyl even though thts
rrae supposecl to conduee to stronger supranatlonal powers, also clashes wlth
the more permisslve approach of the Cornrnon Market freaty ln the ftelds of
traneport pollcy, ald to redundant lndustries anil natlonal subsidies, wlth
the result that very Ltttle  has been done ln these areas. Lack of success
ln agreeing to a cotmron energy pollcy ls partial-Iy attrlbutable to the same
cause, even though the governments of Franee and ltaly  also have here shown
that so far they are qulte unwllllng to subordinate the natl-onal to the
European lnterest.  Another reason for  lack of success J-ies ln the adamant
oppositlon between prlvate and publlc lnterests ldentlflecl wlth coal and o11r
reepectively, ln each na,tlon. In these flelds,  then, the spill-over has
turned lnto a trlckle.
But thts does not exhaust the plcture.  ?he Court of the Coronunltles
has recently pronounced tts  equtvalent of Marbury v. Madison in the Vgn GeryL
Ca6e, laying down clearly the supremscy of Couununlty law ancl holdlng that lt
applles cllrectly to the lntlividua,l citizen,  Several European governments were
fountt guilty of violatlng portlons of the ll?eaty of Rome; 1n all  cases they
fatthfully  carried out the Court's rultnge.  TLre Netherlands, ln exchange for
acceptlng the Comnrrnityts  assoclatton  agreement wlth eighteen Afrlcan states
(an agreement whicb conduces prlnarlly  to the beneflt of France)r extracted
a proml.se that ln the future slngle vetoes could not valldly hold up the-18-
assocletlon of addltlonal outsltle eountries. Deeplte the exeluslon of
Brltatn numerous countrles stlII  feel sufflclently  attracted to or threatened
by the Comnuntty to denancl the opentng of negotlatlone for  some form of
economlc assoetatlon wlth lt.9  AII these manlfestatlons  1mply a continuatlon
of the splll-over process clespite the preferences of the moet aetlve opponents
of eupranatlonal lntegration.  there are further such exarnples. ft  ls  the
Comnunlty vhtch decides the crlterta  of politieal  respectablJ-lty applletl to
candldates for aeeoclatlon: turkey proved respectable, spaln dld not.
SinllarJy, lt  tacit)-y clecltted that permanent neutrallty was lncompatlble wlth
the polltlcal  goals of unlon.  Beeause of Unlted States pressure for a large
cut in tariffs  the Six were forced to accelera,te theLr own schedule of tarlff
tlisnantllng.  In addltion, they were obllged to vork out a corrrnon economlc
and comrnercial posltion toward. the United Sta,tes, Latln America and Afrlca
earlier than planned in order to be abl.e to present a. comnon front 1n GATI.
The associatlon  agreernent wlth the African nations compelled the preparation
of a common pollcy on ald to underdeveloped countries even though France had
been far more interested ln deveLopment  funds from her partners than In advlce
and consent on policy.
Stlll,  the events of the year 1953 gave some justlficatlon  to those
who dispute the longevity of economlc-supranatlonal approaches to regional
government. ft  ls therefore naturel- that the Commlssion of EEC and the High
Authorlty of ECSC should have fallen back on the very dynamic of the New
Europe to advance their cause. And thls they clid do.  fhe Coal and Steel
Comunlty was checked ln lts  endeavor to work out a contrnon energy policy.
But, eonsclous of the implications of this problem wlth respeet to upgradlng
collmon interests among governments, consumers,  prod.ucers  and workers, the
Htgh Authorlty proposed the amendment of lts  Treaty:  "retrenchment"  cartels-19-
for colltertes should be authorleed, subslrlies to permlt bhe eonvrirntoR  of
mlnes should be pennitt,ed, and t;he Cornm\rrrll;y  shr'rulrl br, :rirl.r-' 1.6 eondr.rct, 1tE
oun comrnerclal pollcy toward thtrd corrntries. Ttre rtrJmin,l st.rnt;lon <'1' t;freBe
plan-Llke actlvttles,  of course, would rest l,n Lltt'ltntirls of't,tu, Ititin Authorftylo
The proposal was endorsed. by all  parties ln  Lhe lJurolrtr;:n l':ri'Iiament and
soelallet trade unlons, except the mlner:s'urllotir:. It  wa.s reJectetl. as not
eufflclently protectlve of coal l:y tho lluropean Comnlttee of Coal Producers
and opposed by some Dutch lntereets as too protectlve.  French government and
produeer 6poke6men reJected lt  because J.t would limit  the ablli.t;.y of na,tional
goverrunents to acljust the importation of oll  ln response bo coa-|. productlon
needs. While nothing has been finally  decided the Hlgh Authorlty has opened
I1
the door to a sweeping compromise conclliating a varlety of a,ttitudes.
Even the politics  of nationa,l grandeurl €v€r r^rhen equipped with Mirage W
nuclea,r-arrned. bombers, seems to find the expansion of supranational authority
palatable in the New Europe when velfare planning is at stake.  Such, at least,
is the conclusion to be drawn from the favorable reception the Freneh govern-
ment gave to the EEC Cormrlssion's audaeious program for  "medium-term economlc
eoordination." In 0ctober of L962 the Commission presented a schene for
centrallzed monetary pollcy and intensified business^cycle  research wlth a
vlew tonrard the evolution of a centra.l antt-recession and income policy.  Free
enterprlse-orlented interests responded by denouncing central economic
dlrectlon and delibera.te economic "programming" of the type already practiced
l-n France, Holland and ltaly.  But the goverrunents cooperated in the first
systematic comparison of their national budgets in terms of expected future
economic perforrnancel however, they r+ere slor,r to initiate  the advance plannlng
of desirable anti-recession measures. The Commission, thereupon,  scrapped
the term "programming" and began to refer to "medium-term economic coordina.tion",
which is to involve aggregate  demand and supply forecasts for a four-to-fLve-20-
year pertod. Sinee governments were aLready responslble for spendlng one-thlrd'
of the national income under medlum-terrn condttlonsl efforts to coordlnate
governnent  spending for eycllcal and developnental purposes would. l-n fact
usher 1n Corrrnrnlty-wlde  planning uniler a label found aceeptable even by
1)
Mr. Erhard." Ttle almost unifornrly favorable response of almost all  interest
groups and of the naJor governrnents presages the early implementatlon of thls
reafflnnatlon  of the supranational style.
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To what extent is the future of Europe deterrnined by this verslon of
the past? It  seems to me incontestable  that the future ts determlned  in
the sense that the suprenacy of welfare-domlnated policles is assured. If
supranational lnstitutions already charged with further penetratlng thls
field  are ftrmly anchored in this  supremacy they wlll  survive and flourlsh.
Determinecl is the role of the teehnoerat, the technlcal experts whose
statisttcs and negotiations fashion welfare pollcies, whether this technocrat
is  on the payrolt of a powerful interest group, a national governrnent or a
supranational executive. Deterrnined is the citizen's d.lstrust of simpllstlc
nationallst sl-ogans, the reallzation of which would involve him ln sacriflclng
his peaee or hLs standard of tiving.  Determlned, therefore, is  indlfferenee
to ni]ltarlsm,  adventurism  and herolcs.  If  by the tetm "amerlcan:'zatlon",
whlch many European intellectuals conslder a dirty  wordr we merely mean the
progresoj-ve embotlrgeoisement of tastes snd behavlor patterns which goes along
with lndustrial society in the West a,s veII as 1n the East, then the aneri-
eantzatlon of the New Europe is equally determined.
What is far from deterurlned by historyl however, ls the extent of the
region eo ruled, the clegree of supranationality  the rule vi]}  imply, and-2L-
its  rel-ationship wlth the rest of the western lndustrialized vorld.  Let ue
eonsider each of these lndetermlnate polnts.
Ttre Europe of the Orter Seven, of EFTA, corresponds to the proflle of
the New European soclety even more close\y than doee the European Cornmunity.
In principle, and neglectlng the current forelgn policles of the Cornmunlty,
It  woul6 "flt  ln" perfectly.  Indeedy the history of EFTA untll  February of
I!6J was maLnly one of waltlng and watchlng for the best tine and terms for
rllsbandlng andt entertng the EEC. Wlth the French veto on this  step lt  should
not really eome aB a, surprise that the suprana.tional-lntegratlve  logic began
to assert ltself  ra.pldly wlthin EFTA. Even though the Outer Seven had
foresworn any polltlcal  p1a,ns, had shled away from a customs unlon and had
kept the polltlcally  sensltive lssue of agricultural trade out of their
constltuent  agreement, all  thls began to ehange. Even though the very word
"supranatlonal"  was taboo ln thelr circlel  the style of upgradlng ccrnmon
interests by means of inter-sectorial barga.lns made lts  advent ln 1963. EFTA
becane a. succe66 by default; it  embraced supranatlonallty  as a,n unintended
but lnescapable consequence  of excluston from the Conmunltyl despite aIl
earller Brltlsh,  Swed,lsh and Swlss disclalmers to the contrary.
tn 1953 EFTA began the dlscussion of a eommon commerclal policy agalnst
outslders; tt  inltiated  studles and discusslons of agrlcultura.l trade and
concluded several agricultural  and fisheries agreements; llke mC, it
undertook a dramatic acceletatton in the schedule of removing trade bafflers
among the members, keeplng the schedule elosel-y geared to lts  rivalts'
1'he developed EFTA nations began to stucly concerted policles of developnent
ald to the underdeveloped  members. 0n the instltutlonal  side thisy of coursel
involved. an lncrease in the powers of the erpert; 1t aleo calleil lnto belng
the need for consultlng prlva,te lnterest groups who are now represented ln
a consultatlve conrnittee. And lt  gave rise to a nuclear parllamentary-22-
gathering ln the form of meetlngs of delegates of EFTA parliaments to the
Councll of Europe, As the spokesman for thls group, Per Federspiel, rernerked:
whereas EFTA hae alwaye been conslclered an economic associatLon, and
the EEC a polltlcal  unlon, we found that the polltlcal  approach by the
EFTA countries to the problems concernlng us ra6 generally eoherent .l ?
ancl that DFTA ln ltself  was eapable of developlng a polltlcal  poltcy.--
But how long will  thls last?  Every protestation that EFTA now ls  here
to stay is balanced wlth the assurance that no ftght with EEC is  lntended and
that aII brltlges to it  must remain intact.  Whlle lntra-EFTA trade took
a, marked swlng upward tn 1963, this had not been true prevlously and nay not
remaln true lndefinltely.  Ancl in the meanttme the actual Jolnt pollcies
pursuecl ln Etr{IA would faclLltate an eventual merger wlth EEC by ellmlnatlng
many natlonal rules and praetlces and substltutlng therefor unifiect reglonal
rules whlch resemble those adopted. wlthin EEC. Hence we eannot assume any
klnd of lnevltable  and contlnuous autonomous evolutlon of the Or.rter Seven
slnee on\r Svreclen seens to be certain that thls wouLd be deslrable.
The continued. uncertalnty regardlng the extent of the New European
poltcy lncreases the doubts regardlng the future of supranatlonality as a
fotm of governrnent. Slmple federation remalns excluded simply because there
is no generaLlzed enthusiasm for it;  the constltuttve federal act in the New
Europe of mass polltics  would have to rest on a substratum of passton and
devotlon wtrlch would tllffer  from the older natlonallsm 1n name on\r.  If  a
genutne "Europea.n sentinent"l I  s€nse of vocation and splritual  uniqueness
were actually tn exlstence on a mass scale rather than belng conflned to the
ninde of a few intellectuals,  such a feellng would be ldlentlcal wltb a new
nationallsm wrlt  large.  But there is  llttle  trace of this  sentlment. llitbout
ltl  formal federa.tlon Ls lnconceivable. But de Gaulle's confed.eral  approach
1s equally iruelevant  because 1t reets on false premlses and enjoys feu
supporters apart froq the aged Konrad Adenauer. Both federatlon and-23-
confederatlon remaln tled to the eoncept of soverelgnty and the preemlnence
of the polltlcal.  As l-ong as poLi-tlcal flgures are more lnterested ln
conerete problems and speclflc admlnlstratlve taeks these concepts are anaehro-
nlsme of an earller legal vocabulary. They remain lrrelevant to the future
of the New Europe"
A more relevant controversy,  however, exlsts with respect to the rlegree
to whlch existlng supranational lnstltutions perform satisfactorlly.  Many
Europeans complaln that they do not because they are not sufficlently power-
ful  to ea.rry out alJ- the eeonomle tasks wished on them, because they cannot
formulate a strong policy vis'a'vls the outside world, and because they do
not permit contlnuous democratic eontrol over technocrats and mlnisters.  AIl
these charges are true enough but whether there Ls any sense in clevislng
lnstltutlonal  devlces for overcomlng them is  another question. The corunon
fornula proposed for perfeeting supranatlonallty  among the Six lnvolves a
modest and pragrnatic federallzation.
First,  the three exeeutive bodies are to be merged lnto one European
High Couunission which would enJoy all  the powers now wlelded separa.tely by
the three organs. Second, the three counclls of Mlnlsters would be fused
into one Council of the European Cormnunltles, but otherwlse undergo no change
1l+ ln competenee.-  Third, the economic con.petences of the Conmunitles  would
be extended furtherl following the proposals of the Cornmlsslons and High
Authorityr arid approaehlng gradually a competence  over defense and forelgn
pollcy.  Fourth, d.emoeratic control would be provlded over the ever more
potnrerful technocrats by strengthenlng the powers of the present European
Parllarnent, whose competence  now is  conftned to I  posterlgrl review of exeeutive
actlon and dlsmissal of the executlves. Under the new dlspensation the
Parllament would be elected dlrectly by the E\:ropean cltizenryr thus for the
flrst  time enabllng lt  to participate ln reglonal government; further the-21+-
powere of the Parllament would be expandetl by givlng lt  the power of a prlgrl
revlew over all  executlve pollcyp but not the ablllty  of leglslatlng.
It  may be doubted tbat the dlrect electlon of the ParLlamentr  apart
from glvlng the Comnunlsts reBresentatlon for the flrst  tlme, wtll  result ln
a dranrattc change ln the personallties now lnhabltlng the Assemb1y, or ln a
change of the party balance. d prlo{  revlew, ln a settlng of lnevltable
teehnoeratlc doninance, may clelay the preparatlon of pollcy, but not change
than
lts  content. Publtc particlpatlon nay confuse rather/accelerate  lntegratlon
by glvlng the victims of lndustrlallsm a European platfo::n.  Unlfleatlon of
the executtvesr apart from being opposed currently by France, nright have
conelderable  eonsequences, however. ?he point is,  ratherl as the EEC
Conrnisslonrs Action Program saldr"what we call  the economlc lntegratlon of
Europe ls ln esgence a polltlcal  phenonenon."I5  ,r, other vords, even without
fonnal constltutlonal ehange the present supranational lnstttutlons are llkely
to acquire the porlrers necessa.ry to advance welfare.
In the meantine, the tmpLementatlon  of the reform program ts apt to
hlnder the lntegratlon of the EFTA bloc tnto the New Europe. The outslders
are unlikely to ad.vance as enthuslastlcally to all-European  lntegratlon--onee
thts becomes polltically  concetvable--lf they are confronted with an already
hlghly cteveloped eet of guasl-federal lnstltutions.  Ttrlsl of course, 1s a
reason for  advoca,tes of an "Inner Europe" to proceed wtth lnstitutionallzatlon
as raplcl\y as posslble. The supranational-lntegratlve  loglc suggests the
tlghtening of relatlons anong the Six and among the Seven. It  can teach us
littre  about the tle  betweeq the two broes, except to suggest that rapld
federallzatlon in one ls Llkety to repel the other.
Even more lndetermlna.te is the future relatlonehlp between the New
Europe and the North Anerl"can rorld.  Nei.ther the ntlitary  ties of NATO nor
the economic llnks of OECD have sparrned the kinds of rela.tlonshlps  on which
a eel-f-sustainlng  splll-over process could thrlve.  Short of lnauguratlng-2r-
a slngle Atla.ntic defense and arms productlon policy and an Atlantlc customs
unlon tt  1s doubtful- that the basis for sueh a process couJ-d be ereated. fn
the absenee of any such trend the competlng formulas of fecleratlonr partnershlpl
concentrlsm and, polycentrisn all  remain equally plauslble tn terms of logic,
though not ln probabillty of lmplementation"
The sweeplng and audacLous tnstitutlonal  formula pressed ln the famous
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Declara,tlon of Atlantlc Unlty ls the ]east probable.  It  places the need for
an active ':derallzing lmpulse in the Atlantlc world on the conmunist threat;
but the example of the Community of Six suggests that an external threat is
of seeondary usefulness  among the many stlmull pushlng toward perrnanent unity.
It  indlscrlninate\r lauds all  strlctLy European efforts towar,cl unlty on the
mLstalcen assumption that this must necessarl\r  conduce to the greater beneflt
of North America as weII.  And it  stresses the need for the funmedlate creatlo:r
of new federal Atlanttc instltutlons whtle saylng next to nothing about the
concrete tasks facing the Atlantlc natlons or the d.uties these instltutions
might be expected to perform. Atlanttc federatlon substltutes lnstltutional
gimmlckry for efforts at upgradlng eomnon lnterests ln substantive and plvotal
poltcy confllcts.
In the rnllttary fletcl thls confllct revolves around the actlve
hegemonlal role of the Unlted States, especlally ln the fteld of nuclear
strategy. ftre Nassau Agreement and lts  posslble extenslon to Flance a,e well
as the scheme for a multtla,teral nuclear fleet  for NATO dlsgulse but do not
obllterate thls hegenony. While these sehemes multilaterallze  the eontrol
of the safety ca,tch they merely perpetuate the Amertcan preponderanee  as
concerns technologlgy orrtrs procurement and strategtc doctrlne; the cholce left
to the E\ropean partlcipa,nts ls  so limlted as to affront thelr  own sense of
purpose and competence. In the economic fleld,  the confliet hlnges around
that
the faet/the lnterests of the Atlantlc natlons are nelther homogeneous nor-26-
equalty tntense wlth respect to lntra-AtLantlc  and world-wlde trade and
investruent. Japanr Latln America and parts of South Aela are more importa.nt
to the Unlted Statee; Afrlca, +\e Mtd<lle Eaet and the temperate-zone
ComohweaLth  Countrles tend to preoeeupy Europe. No amount of federallzing
and lnvocatl-on of cornmuniet dangers can gloes over the dlfferences ln interests
rega.rdlng lnternatlonal monetary llqutdltyr  pri.ce etabillty  for agrlcultural
cosrootlltles and economle  developnent  needs.
Ttrose most lmpressed by these confllcte oopsldor and sonetlnee accept thc
opposlte of the fecleral fonnula: the path of western polycentrlsm, 8. 6ort
of sauve--S!-peut policy under which each maJor country or bloc would seek
Its  own salvatlon as best lt  ean in terms of heterogeneous and aslmnetrlcal
tles withln and outslde the Atlantic worltl.  I{ATO nlght well survlve herep
but its  tasks rculd. remaln confined to the narrow aspects of nllltary  pollcy
1T
on which interests converge. '  Both EflIA ancl EEC would prosper, the Cornnonweal*h
would remaln ldentlfied wlth Brltalnrbut Canada and the Unlted $tates would
have to nake the best deal theY can-
The eoncentrlc approach was devisect to head off  such tendencles but
it  despalrs of a real meshlng and upgradlng of Atlantlc lnterests.  Thls
approach grante that the West has a Iot to gal-n by naxlmlzing lts  contrlbutlon
to economlc d.evelopment ln the non-western worldl through tighter plannlng
and coortllnatlon |n OECD. It  grants further that the mess in agrlculture
coulcl toglcal-ly be solvecl only ln terme of some Jolnt Atlantlc policy geared
to that of the maJor one-crop exporting nations.  Monetary matters also
would have to be Jointly discussed.. But the coneentrlc approach takes for
granted that asyrnmetrles between the Unttect Statesr Brltain and the EEC would
contlnue Just the 6ame. Therefore lt  conceives of a. serLes of concentric
ctrcles, with the Cormounlty at the centerl and radlatlng outward in ever
veaker rippl-es to take in the Atlantic world as well ers Japan. Coordlnatlon-27-
could not be e)eected to proceed. beyond the pattern of dllecueslon  and
confrontatton concernlng  monetaryl trade and ald pollcles nor belng carried
on lelsure1y tn OECD.I8
Tfrat leaves us with the "partnerehtp" fonnula. ft  shouLd be noted from
the outset that the soul-eearchlng  antl plaruring assoclatecl wtth thls  approach
is to be taken very serlous\r because, for the flrst  tlme ln the Atlantlc
settlng, it  proceeds fron a concern wlth tnterrnal confllct rather than merely
respondlng to a temporary  an<[ lnternrittent external threat as I{ATO always has.
If  partnership ls to unlte the Weet "there must be a genulne cllvlslon of labor
between the two halves of the alJlance. The concept of  'lnterdependence'  will
no'b be satisfled by aty formula that assumes that advanced technology Is  an
American prerogatLve, and whlch attempts to appJ-y a divlslon of effort  whlch
is at varlance wtth economlc real-ltl-es and capabilltles."l9 In short, lt
tmrst involve a mllitary pollcy of sharing not onJy weapone a6 end producte
and Jolnt control over launchlng them, but also a cormon pollcy of research,
productlon, targetlng auil col@eOd'  Unlees eomplete rather than fragnentary
nultllaterallzatlon  takes place the Gaulllst clain of a "special. reJ-atLonshlp"
between the Unlted States ancl Brltaln retalns tts  ptauslbitity.  And de Gaulle's
offere of a separate conttnental deterrent, perhaps llrrked to Brltalnrs by
way of Western European Unlon, wlII  becme lncreaslng)y attractlve to E\rrope.
It  hae already been partlalJ,y end.orsed by Western f,\ropean Unlon, A mere
eoordlnatlon of natlonal efforts,  as nov tn NATO, wlll  not advanee Atlantlc
lntegratlon.  A true lntegration under Unltedt Statee leadershlp wlll  be
resented. and cause fragmentation. Only eo'aplete sharlng can set the scene
for the upgradlng of cormon interests from whieh further lntegratlve steps
can spil1 over into other pollcy conterts.
And so lt  1s ln the economlc realm. $hort-run dlscusslon coneernlng
smaIl eteps for easlng the Unlted States gold outflow wllL not create a-2E-
EplLl-over. Nelther wlll- practlcee ln 0ECD under whlch gror,rth ratee and
economic ald measures are frankly dtscueeed and crl.tlclzed.. Jolnt poltclee
tn the flelds of eornmerclal polley, agrtcuLtural marketlng, falr conpetltlon
and monetary stablltty are calLed for,  The nature of the taek must define
the creatlon of approprlate lnetltuttone. Theee, slnce the tagk bears so
mueh elmllarlty to what has been clone by the European Communlty, wlll
approxlnate the eupranatlonal-  etyLe no matter by what nane they are called..
lhe Atlantlc Instltute ln Parls took the lnltlattve tn eoncentratlng on theee
taekg flrst  and devlslng flttlng  instltutlons thereafter' ft  basee lts plan
on a blpartlte Atlanttc Partnershtp which reeogntzes snd proJects the lnte-
gratlve leeson of the New Europe. ft  proposed a eounell of lJlse Men, to
advise a Unlted States-Brltlsh  mC Conmlttee, and eventual\y a blpartlte
"Partnerehtp Councll." Once thls recognitlon of neett and task slnks lnto our
mlnds the New Surope can be creatlvely }lnkecl wlth the older North Amerlca.NOTES
Ttre ter::n "the New Europe" was made fanlllar  by George Llchthetmz The New
Eyrogg,--Today, allg i"*gF."q{ (tlew rort:  Praeger, .l-953), whoge-guneiff ile-*
FTffineE-ffihare  affioet completely.  The econornlc and soclological
reasonlng and analysls whlch underltes the concept ls developed 1n the
followlng pubJ-lcatlons:  Ral-f Dahrendorfl 9lasl and C1eeq Confllct ln
Industrlal Soclety (Stanfora: $tanfora UnfieretilPEss, itril;  Fayilond
I'roil5ffi  Fffie  lddotoglque?" ln Adorno and Dirks (eds'), S-o!{glogisa
(frankfurt: Europflsche Veitagsanstaltr L955h Daniel BeIl, The End, of
Ideology (Glencoe:  The Free Press, f960)1 Gunnar Myrdalr g_"ypng !,he. Wel.Tare
u-1fiuw Haven: yale Unlversity Press, r96oh s.M. Llpset, ''The Changing
Class Strueture and Contemporary [l."opu"r, Polltics" I DaedaErs (W1nter, L90+)
International System", Intern?I'lgnal  9ggn13g!199,
1953)r pp' 537-538. My understanding and reJectlon
rehabilltated concept of "confederation"  owes much
"Internatlonal  Integration and the Modern State",
studies., vol. IIr  no. l- (1963)
Herbert Tingsten, "Stabifity  and Vlta.llty |n $redish Democracy",
QuarteTbr, vol.  Z6 (tgSl)r pp. Iho-I5I.
2Roy pry"e, TFe po-ptlcgl {qlqrp. gf !h.  qqTopean C-.o.nlgunlty (London: Marshbankr
L962), p. 19.
3Ptu"" Confereneey Parls, September 5t Lg6O. PEP, 0c..cgslonal= PapergrNo' 11,
p. 12.  Nothing which has been saicl by de Gaulle slnce changes this vlew
of thlngs.
l+ 'These alternatlves are convincingly and perceptively elqplorecl by Stanley
Iloffmann, "Dlscord tn Communlty: The North Atlantic Area as a Partlal
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5Herbert l,irttryr "La Sulese A contre-courant", fggIg€. (Octoter 1963), P. 27,
TIA1" argument ls ful1y developed ln Hoffnannr 9P. cit.p  pp' 526'53J-'
These formulatlons are developed
Eqropegn
lo-rr.
o tln  January of 1953 all  members of EfltA had applied elther for fu1I or
associate memberehip. As of October, L963, only Austria was conducting
actlve negotlations for  some kind of a.ssoclati.on, while France was obliged'
to aceede to her partners'demand  for contlnued contact wlth Brita.ln by way
of the Western  European Unlon, Other natlons wlth whom various t1ryes of
assoclatton were belng negotlated at the ttme of wrltlng are: 1\rkey, fsrael,
Cyprus, freland, AlgerJ.a, Iran.  Greece had become an assocla,te member wlth
the lntentlon of becomtng a full  member ln )-!8\; lts  economlc tles  and
obllgattons to the Conrnunity were so defined as to amount to complete unlon
by that date.  The agreement of assoclatlon with the elghteen Afrlcan natlons
(lff  fo"rer Freneh, Italian  and Bel-glan possesslons, except Gulnea) provideo
for a preferential EEC tariff  on 6ome African erports and for  a. nll  tariff
on some others, but opens Afrlca to EEC exports on a preferentlal  basis
and conflrms the rlght of establlshment, It  steps up and diverslfies EEC
flnancial ald to Afrlcan devel,opment, creates a standing lnstltuttonal
nechanlsm and a system of cornpulsory arbltration for the settlernent of
trade and financial disputes. For an officlal  sumtary of the Convention see
Bulletln of the ffiC, Vol. VI, no. 2(Brussels,  February f963)r PP. 2L-25.
by Leon N. Llnd.berg, Tle Politlcal  Dynamics
(Sianrora: stonfora unlGrffis,  LtCfr Economlc Integratiggt2
EFTA
Iouu"on".n Coal and SteeL Connunlty, Hlgh
SaElrolt cdpd{a\(npril  1963)r pp. 29-3r.
r.
'Tne formulatlon and negotlatlon of the Commisslonte approach ls under the
dlrectlon of Robert MarJolln, who dld nruch the eame kind of Job ln France
und.er the authorlty of the comlsartat au PIan between lt45 and l-91+8, The
bundle of proposals was end.orsed. by a variety of French offlclale,  I-ncludlng
M. Bokanowshl, Mlnlster of Industrles, several German lndustrtal and CDU
spokesmenr aL1 soclalist parties and soclallst trade unlons, and the D:tch
employere. "'  va6 opposed by the German FDP and cautlously endorsed by Erhard.
see Egropearr.9."glqilr.-(y?: 5:, september rg5:), p. 3. Bri]letln of. the EEC, vol. Vf, no. 3 (March 1963)r pp. 23-A6
4gporler, (no. Ba, Sept. tfr  1963)r p.Z.
lfrtfu ls the essence of a Ihrtch proposal for the fuslon of the executlves,
presented to the Counclle of Mlnlsters on June 27, 1961. Text ln Prlrce, op.
91t., pp. 1OO-IO2. For the text of the Draft Conventlon for tllrect elect6ns
to the European Parllament see ibi:d., p. 98.
rh - For a fuII exposltlon of thle llne of thought ln the nrind of the EEC
Cornnisslon see Walter HaLlstein, Unl_te-d Eulopg-, (Canbrldge:  Harvard Unlversl-ty
Press, f952)r pp. 6Z-66.
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For a sunnary of the Declaration of Atlantlc unlty and a varlety of
end.orsemente see The Atlanti" Cgnmun$y.  euarterU, vol. I1 no. 2(Sunner 1963),
pp. 275-2J5, and ifrA frfr['TFtffitEleffifappeared tn the iprtng tgSS-"
issue of the same publicatlon.
Ifu. u"* Beloffl "Brttalnr
Oreanlga,tion, vol. XVII,
L7
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united states Relatlons with the Atlantlc courmunlty", l!l!.r  pp. 626-6a7.
The eeonomic lssues at stake are discussed by WitLiarn ffiolil,  Jr.,
"Econonnlc Aspects of an Atlanttc coruraunlty", ibtd., especialry p. 6i]r tt.
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and the Atlantlc Alliance;  l\lo Strategles or One?"
Studies, voI. I1 no. 3(I%Z), D.p5O.
t8tu"ru Uri et  al ; Partnership for progress: A program for
Actlon (New Iork, Harper & Ron, L95il, -speclallyl;:96-mT,fransatlantlc